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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-THE OKLAHOMA
VERSION
Page Keeton*
The 34th Legislature of Oklahoma in the first regular session en-
acted a statute, based on an existing Arkansas statute, providing for a
"modified" comparative negligence compensation system when a claim-
ant seeks recovery of damages against a defendant or defendants if
(1) the basis for the claimants recovery is negligence and (2) the neg-
ligence resulted in death or harm to person or property. No attempt
was made by the legislature to answer many new issues that the adop-
tion of comparative negligence will raise and that will have to be an-
swered by judicial decision. The statute simply provides:
Section 1. Comparative negligence:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery of dam-
ages for any injury, property damage or death where the
negligence of the person injured or killed is of lesser degree
than the negligence of any person, firm, or corporation
causing such damage.
In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence result-
ing in personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to prop-
erty, contributory negligence shall not prevent a recovery
where any negligence of the person so injured, damaged, or
killed is of lesser degree than any negligence of the person,
firm, or corporation causing such damage; provided that
where such contributory negligence is shown on the part of
the person injured, damaged or killed, the amount of the re-
covery shall be diminished in proportion to such contributory
negligence.
Section 2. Defense of contributory negligence or as-
sumption of risk as question of fact:
The defense of contributory negligence or of assump-
tion of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; SJ.D., Harvard University. Dean, The Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law.
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fact, and shall at all times be left to the jury, unless a jury
is waived by the parties.'
Thus, Oklahoma, almost simultaneously with its neighbor Texas2
follows a number of other states in abolishing by legislation the com-
mon law doctrine established in England in 18093 which was based
primarily on the notion that where both an injured victim and another
are at fault in causing a damaging event, the courts should leave the
1. S.B. No. 138, Okla. Laws 1973 ch. 30.
2. H.B. No. 88, 1 Tex. Laws 1973 at 41. The Texas statute is as follows:
Modified comparative negligence
Section 1. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or party or the legal representative of any person or party to
recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to persons or
property if such negligence is not greater than the negligence of the person
or party or persons or parties against whom recovery is sought, but any dam-
ages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the person or party recovering.
Contribution among joint tort-feasors
Section 2(2) In this section:
(1) "Claimant" means any party seeking relief, whether he is a plaintiff,
counterclaimant, or cross-claimant.
(2) "Defendant" includes any party from whom a claimant seeks relief.
(b) In a case in which there is more than one defendant, and the
claimant's negligence does not exceed the total negligence of all defendants,
contribution to the damages awarded to the claimant shall be in proportion to
the percentage of negligence attributable to each defendant.
(c) Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount
of the judgment awarded the claimant, except that a defendant whose negli-
gence is less than that of the claimant is liable to the claimant only for that
portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attrib-
utable to him.
(d) If an alleged joint tort-feasor pays an amount to a claimant in set-
tlement, but is never joined as a party defendant, or having been joined, is
dismissed or nonsuited after settlement with the claimant (for which reason
the existence and amount of his negligence are not submitted to the jury),
each defendant is entitled to deduct from the amount for which he is liable
to the claimant a percentage of the amount of the settlement based on the
relationship the defendant's own negligence bears to the total negligence of
all defendants.
(e) If an alleged joint tort-feasor makes a settlement with a claimant
but nevertheless is joined as a party defendant at the time of the submission
of the case to the jury (so that the existence and amount of his negligence
are submitted to the jury) and his percentage of negligence is found by the
jury, the settlement is a complete release of the portion of the judgment at-
tributable to the percentage of negligence found on the part of that joint tort-
feasor.
(f) In the application of the rules contained in Subsections (a) through
(e) of this section results in two claimants being liable to each other in dam-
ages, the claimant who is liable for the greater amount is entitled to a credit
toward his liability in the amount of damages owed him by the other claim-
ant.
(g) All claims for contribution between named defendants in the pri-
mary suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a named de-
fendant may proceed against a person not a party to the primary suit who has
not effected a settlement with the claimant.
3. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
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parties as they are in the spirit of the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands.4
The Texas statute, unlike that in Oklahoma, attempts to an-
swer a variety of issues in addition to establishing a basic policy, and
it will be interesting to observe -the course of development of com-
parative negligence under the two kinds of statutes-the general and
the specific. There is much to be said for the more general Oklahoma
type leaving much discretion to the supreme court to fill in the details.
Details of the law related to a general policy position are generally re-
solved with greater success through the judicial rather than the legis-
lative process but at the outset the general statute will result in more
uncertainty and will be productive of more litigation. Harmful side
effects will be the consequence of getting a more just disposition of
personal injury claims through comparative negligence. There will be
greater complexity in the handling of litigation and the settlement of
claims, at least for several years. The more decisional points involved
in litigation and the more complex the trial of a law suit becomes, the
more judicial time it takes to resolve controversies and the more likely
it is that errors will be made producing reversals and retrials. Moreover,
there is a substantial likelihood that settlements of disputes will be
discouraged rather than encouraged because of the greater difficulties
in evaluating the worth of a claim without litigation.
In the preparation of these observations, an effort has been made
(1) to make a comparison between the Texas and Oklahoma versions
of comparative negligence and (2) to identify and comment on issues
that are not answered by the Oklahoma legislature but which will have
to be judicially resolved.
Firstly, comparative negligence has been adopted only when neg-
ligence is the basis for recovery and when personal injury, death or
physical damage to property results. The Oklahoma statute could
hardly be construed otherwise because of the initial sentence of the
second paragraph of Section 1, which begins as follows: "In all actions
hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in personal injuries or
wrongful death or injury to property. . . ." Therefore, no change in
existing law, whatever it is, has been made with respect to claims based
on a theory of strict liability such as is the case when suit is brought
against the manufacturer or other seller in the marketing chain on the
4. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAm~IEs, Tim LAw o TORTS § 22.2, at 1202 (1956); Hague,
Comparative Negligence: A Reform Long Overdue, 49 ORE L. Rav. 38 (1969).
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ground that a product was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Moreover, no change is made in existing law with respect to intangible
economic losses resulting from negligence in the absence of physical
harm, such as when an accountant negligently certifies to false facts
regarding the financial condition of a corporation. This is not to imply
or suggest that the adoption by the legislature of comparative negli-
gence with respect to claims based on negligence resulting in physical
harm should not be relevant as to the proper solution by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma of the effect of a claimant's negligence in these
non-included areas. The fact that the legislature chose to restrict the
coverage of the statute does not mean that the legislature intended to
prevent the court from doing so.
Secondly, it is said that contributory negligence shall not prevent
a recovery where any negligence of the claimant is of lesser degree
than any negligence of the person, firm or corporation causing such
damage. Thus, of the two principal variants of comparative negli-
gence, Oklahoma has adopted the "modified" form rather than the
"pure" form.5 Contributory negligence remains a complete bar to re-
covery, if the claimant's negligence is equal to or greater than the neg-
ligence of the defendant or defendants. The pure form would allow
plaintiff to recover something regardless of the degree of his fault,
such as now exists as to claims made pursuant to the Federal Employ-
er's Liability Act. Under the pure form recovery according to fault
is extended to its logical limits.6 State legislatures in providing for
comparative negligence have generally adopted a modified version, but
I must say that the objections that have been made to the pure form
are largely based on a distrust of the jury and a feeling that claimant
5. There are two general categories of comparative negligence systems. The first
is the pure form which has been provided for in Mississippi by statute, in Florida by
judicial decison, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, under the Jones Act and
in England. See Mitchell v. Croft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958);
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1958); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 766
(1958); Contributory Negligence Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c.28, § 221.
The record or modified version takes two forms. The rule in Arkansas, Georgia
and now Oklahoma is that contributory negligence is not a bar if the contributor's
negligence is less than that of defendant. Whatley v. Henry, 16 S.E.2d 214 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1941); Riddell v. Little, 488 S.W.2d 34 (Ark. 1972).
The other modified version provides that contributory negligence is not a bar if
such negligence -is not greater than that of defendant. This is the rule in Wisconsin
and Texas. These lists are not intended to be all inclusive. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.-
045 (1971).
6. See Bissen v. FujiL, - Haw. -, 466 P.2d 429 (1970) (Levinson, J., dissent-ing).
[Vol. 10: 19
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under a pure form will nearly always recover something. These ob-
jections are hardly persuasive.
There is a third alternative that could have been made to the
doctrine that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery.
The simplest and oldest method for dealing with contributory negli-
gence is to divide the damages equally between the negligent parties.
It was developed in England around 1700 by the English Admiralty
Courts. It is still followed by the American courts of admiralty in
collision cases. 7 This is the method that has been commonly provided
for in legislation that has been passed in most states providing for
contribution among joint tortfeasorsA At common law, contribution
was not available as between joint tortfeasors, the policy behind that
being the same as that applicable to the rule that contributory negli-
gence was a complete bar to recovery and only a few states have pro-
vided for contribution without legislation. 9 Contribution between joint
tortfeasors is not available in Oklahoma,10 and this creates a serious
problem with respect to the proper administration of a comparative
negligence system about which more will be said later. The division
of damages equally between the negligent parties will ultimately be
found to be the simplest and best solution both when the claimant was
one of the negligent parties as well as when he is not. It could have
been the solution arrived at long ago by judicial decision. 1 The dis-
7. For a discussion of the history and development of this in Admiralty, see Pros-
ser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465-75 (1953). See also Derby, Di-
vided Damages in Maritime Cases, 33 VA. L. REv. 289 (1947).
8. About half of the states have passed statutes providing for contribution among
joint tortfeasors and some nine states have provided for contribution by judicial deci-
sion. W. PRossmR, LAw OF ToRTs § 50 (4th ed. 1971). See also UNIFoRM CoNTRI-
iTioN AMONG ToRT-FFASOIIS Acr (adopted in 1955 by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws).
9. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Best v. Yerkes, 77 N.W.2d
23 (Iowa 1956); Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith, 208 N.W. 13 (Minn.
1926).
10. Oklahoma's contribution statute is set forth in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 831
(1971). It has been construed as not applicable to joint tortfeasors or wrongdoers.
National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 434 P.2d 238 (Okla.
1967); Fakes v. Price, 18 Okla. 413, 89 P. 1123 (1907); Home Indemnity Co. v.
Thompson, 434 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1967). In the first cited case the court said: "De-
spite the claim that defendant's conduct was unconscionable, the settled law in Okla-
homa does not afford a right of contribution.. . ." 434 P.2d at 241. Unless by legis-
lation an unconscionable result is required, it is submitted that the court has the power
and the duty to avoid unconscionable results. Some authors have said that the courts
have misinterpreted the statute. Merrill, Oklahoma and the Uniform State Lmv Pro-
gram, 38 OKLA. B. Ass'N J. 643 (1967); Holder, An Application of the Oklahoma
Contribution Statute to Joint Tortfeasors, 5 TuisA L.J. 62 (1968).
11. Nine states have done so; see note 8 supra.
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tinction between a situation where A and B through their negligence
jointly injure A and a situation where A and B jointly injure C is diffi-
cult for me to grasp as regards the proper apportionment of damages
between the wrongdoers.
Thirdly, Oklahoma has adopted that modified form of compara-
tive negligence that bars a claimant from recovery when he and the
defendant are equally at fault. Thus, if each is found to be 50 per-
cent negligent, then neither can recover against the other if injured.
The decision on this situation is, it seems to me, quite important be-
cause the most frequently recurring result will probably be that result,
or if not, it should be. Often, a fair-minded jury will not be able to
identify a difference in the degree of negligence of the parties to the
litigation and the attempt to fix different percentages of negligence for
the parties will not be realistic. My conclusion on this may, however,
be the result of bias in favor of not making an attempt to do so but
rather dividing damages equally between those responsible for a dam-
aging event as is done with respect to collisions in maritime cases.
Texas adopted a contrary result by stating that contributory negligence
will not bar recovery if such negligence is not greater than the negli-
gence of the defendant or defendants. 12  I very much favor the allow-
ance of recovery when claimant and defendant are equally at fault.
Apparently in Wisconsin, as a result of a recent amendment, and in
New Hampshire, a claimant can recover if he and the defendant are
equally to blame,' whereas a plaintiff cannot do so in Arkansas,' 4
the language of the Arkansas statute being that which was adopted
by Oklahoma. No doubt the states that have adopted the position
that a plaintiff who was equally to blame for a damaging event recov-
ers nothing were actuated by the idea that when the claimant is in
equal fault with the defendant there should be no recovery. If a com-
parative negligence system of any kind is adopted, it is submitted that
the pure form is better and that next would be the modified form
with recovery allowed when the parties are equally to blame, so on
this point I am critical of the Oklahoma statute.
The modified form in either version, that of Texas or Oklahoma,
will often result in greater hardship to a negligent party and victim
than he suffered when contributory negligence was a complete bar.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1971); 4A N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a
(1969).
14. 3A ARK. SrAT. § 27-1730.1 (1961).
[Vol. 10: 19
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Let us assume a traffic accident with both drivers injured and jury
findings as follows:
Negligence Damages
Driver A 40% $ 50,000
Driver B 60% 100,000
In this illustration B, who was 60 percent negligent will bear all of his
injuries without recourse against anyone except for whatever first-party
insurance he holds, and in addition will be liable to A for 60 percent
of A's damages for a total of $130,000, or 86 percent of the damages.
Yet the likelihood is that there was little, if any, perceptible difference
in the degree of fault of the respective parties. In providing A with
some recovery, B has been grossly overburdened.
A third point about the Oklahoma statute, as is of course true of
the Arkansas counterpart, is its ambiguity with reference to a situation
involving multiple parties. The Texas statute provides that "in a case
in which there is more than one defendant, and the claimant's negli-
gence does not exceed the total negligence of all defendants, contribu-
tion to the damages awarded shall be in proportion to the percentage
of negligence attributable to each defendant."15  Thus in Texas the
legislature has expressly provided that multiple defendants are to be
treated as a unit for the purpose of deciding the basic issue of whether
or not a claimant committed less or greater negligence than the de-
fendants. This same result has been achieved in Arkansas by inter-
pretation in the interesting case of Walton v. Tull,16 although there
was a strong dissent by the chief justice. This case involved two acci-
dents at night, the first occurring when a station wagon driven by Wal-
ton was involved in a minor collision with the car driven by Bingham
as Walton was trying to pass and Bingham was turning left. These
vehicles came to rest on the left side of the highway with the lights on.
Tull, the claimant, was painfully and seriously injured when he was
struck by Glenn, a drunk driver, as Tull was getting out of the station
wagon. The jury findings as to the negligence of the parties were as
follows: Glenn-60%; Walton-20%; Bingham-10%; and Tull,
the claimant-10%. Glenn was insolvent. It was held that Tull could
recover all but 10%o of his damages against Bingham, even though
Bingham was as much at fault as the plaintiff was. Moreover, under
15. This is § 2b of the statute as set forth in full in note 2 supra.
16. 356 S.W.2d 20 (Ark. 1962). See also Riddell v. Little, 488 S.W.2d 34 (Ark.
1972).
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the decision the claimant could recover all of his damages against a
defendant who was not even as negligent as the claimant. Thus, if it
is assumed that Tull was 15% negligent and Bingham was 5% negli-
gent, Bingham could be held for 85% of claimant's damages. The
dissenting chief justice made the following observation:
I agree thoroughly with that position taken by Mr.
Dobbs in his Legislative Note .... to the effect that the
legislature did not intend a recovery against any defendant
whose negligence was not greater than that of the plaintiff.
In fact, I have found no case to the contrary. It appears to
me that the position taken by the Majority may well work an
undue hardship on a defendant who may have had but little
to do with injuries sustained by a plaintiff. For example,
let us say "A" sues "B" and "C" as joint tortfeasors, and the
jury finds defendant "B" guilty of 74% negligence, defend-
ant "C" guilty of 1% negligence, and plaintiff "A" guilty
of 25% negligence. "A's" damages are fixed at $40,000.
"B" is insolvent. Under the Majority holding, plaintiff "A",
though 24% more negligent than defendant "C", can collect
75% of his damages from "C" (his own 25% negligence
being deducted). This results in "C" having to satisfy "A's"
judgment to the extent of $30,000, though his own negli-
gence was at the very minimum.17
The primary difficulty, therefore, about treating defendants as a
unit is that it allows a claimant who was guilty of as much or greater
negligence than a particular defendant to recover his entire damages
diminished only by his own negligence against that defendant.
In Wisconsin, pursuant to a similar statute declaring that con-
tributory negligence is not a bar to recovery "if such negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought,"1 the supreme court has held that each defendant must be
treated individually on the issue of whether or not the claimant is
guilty of lesser negligence. The term "any person'" as is used in the
Oklahoma and Arkansas statutes is somewhat easier to construe as
including the plural than "the person" can be. Arguably, of course,
the Oklahoma statute should be construed as the Arkansas court con-
strued its statute since that construction had been made before the
adoption by the Oklahoma legislature of comparative negligence, but
this assumes that in passing the statute the Oklahoma legislators
17. 356 S.W.2d at 27.
18. Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1971).
[Vol. 10: 19
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adverted to this problem and were aware of the construction that had
been placed on the Arkansas statute with reference to it.
Historically, if the negligence of two or more tortfeasors prox-
imately causes a single and indivisible injury each defendant is subject
to liability for the entire damages recoverable by plaintiff. This has
been virtually a universally accepted proposition when either the plain-
tiff was not contributorily negligent or, if negligent, an exception to the
rule barring recovery such as last clear chance was applicable. Each
caused the entire damage and the risk of insolvency of one of the
tortfeasors was not placed on the innocent victim but rather on the
other wrongdoer. 19 There would be few to question the soundness of
that result. But this principle of entire liability of each of the negli-
gent defendants is of questionable soundness when plaintiff was also
negligent in causing his injury. It is the entire liability principle that
produces the unfair results that the chief justice of the Arkansas Su-
preme Court was concerned about. The Texas statute provides that
each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of
the judgment awarded the claimant except that a defendant whose neg-
ligence is less than that of the claimant is liable for only that portion
of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attribu-
table to him. This alleviates the problem but does not completely
eliminate the unfairness.
But the unfairness resulting to a particular defendant by treating
the defendants as a unit in ascertaining whether or not the claimant
is guilty of equal or greater negligence is magnified when, as in Okla-
homa, contribution is not available. Thus in Oklahoma, unless con-
tribution is made available as between joint tortfeasors by statute or
judicial decision, a tortfeasor who was only slightly negligent and less
so than claimant could be held liable for claimant's entire damages,
diminished only by claimant's negligence, even though there was an-
other solvent tortfeasor who was guilty of much greater negligence than
the defendant. It should be observed, however, that even with con-
19. The typical case is of course that of two vehicles colliding, but there are a
variety of situations where the negligence of two or more defendants are each a "but
for" and a proximate cause of a damaging event out of which a single and indivisible
injury arises. See Arnst v. Estes, 8 A.2d 201 (Me. 1939); Johnson v. Chapman, 28
S.E. 744 (W. Va. 1897); RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF ToiTs § 433A (1964). Under
this section damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes only
where there are distinct harms or there is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of each cause to a single harm. I think the Restatement section is ambiguous
and even inaccurate.
9
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tribution an undue burden can be imposed on a particular tortfeasor
or the plaintiff in regarding each person individually. Thus if a vic-
tim is found to be 30% negligent, he could recover 70% of his
damages only if some defendant was guilty of greater negligence and
that defendant would have no recourse against anyone.
Plaintiff Defendant B C
Negligence 30% 40% 207o 107o
Damages $100,000
Plaintiff recovers $70,000 against defendant.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has the judicial power to pro-
vide for contribution. Whereas restraint in providing for contribution
judicially has heretofore been justifiable, such judicial restraint in the
face of the incongruous result that would be produced by the compara-
tive negligence statute, if interpreted as Arkansas has done, should
not be expected. Contribution, it seems to me, must be provided for
in Oklahoma, either by statute or judicially if comparative negligence is
to work fairly and effectively.
Multiple Parties and Joinder. Heretofore, liability of joint tort-
feasors has been joint and several in the sense that a claimant could
proceed jointly or separately against the parties to a damaging event.20
If a claimant proceeded separately against one of the parties to a dam-
aging event, but failed to recover or did not get full satisfaction of a
judgment rendered in his behalf, he could file a separate suit there-
after against another. Moreover, a person who was proceeded against
separately was not required to implead another person in order to ob-
tain contribution.21 The complications resulting from a modified com-
parative negligence system, especially the type where all persons pro-
ceeded against are treated as a unit in deciding whether or not plaintiff
committed the greater negligence, seem to be enormous if this practice
is allowed in the future. Since contribution has not been available in
Oklahoma,22 I will simply say that it is a problem if contribution is
made available and if not made available comparative negligence will
not work satisfactorily. Arguably, a plaintiff who proceeds to judg-
20. Hassier Stone Co. v. McCain, 133 Ind. 231, 31 N.E. 956 (1892); Kennedy
v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954); National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Okla-
homa Turnpike Authority, 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967); Fakes v. Price, 18 Okla. 413,
89 P. 1123 (1907).
21. Of course, contribution is not available in Oklahoma. See Calihan Interests,
Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
gg. Note 10 suprq,
[Vol. 10: 19
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss1/5
1974] OKLAHOMA'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 29
ment and was found to be negligent should not be able to file a sep-
arate law suit relitigating issues related to the percentage that his neg-
ligence bore to the total negligence of all parties to the event. He
should be estopped from asserting the negligence of others if they could
have been brought into the initial law suit.
Off-set. Many traffic accidents as well as other types of damaging
events bring about multiple deaths and injuries to those who were neg-
ligently responsible for such events. Often, therefore, persons involved
in subsequent litigation will be both claimants and defendants. An
important question has to do with whether a claimant who is liable for
the greater amount is entitled to a credit toward his liability in the
amount of damages owed him by the other pursuant to whatever rules
of comparative negligence apply. The rule of entire liability of each
of two or more joint tortfeasors, the rule that defendants will be treated
as a unit in deciding whether or not a claimant is guilty of the lesser
negligence and a situation involving multiple claims by the negligent
parties combine to complicate the fixing of the recovery, especially
when provision is made for off-set. The Texas statute specifically
provides for off-set with the stipulation that "the claimant who is liable
for the greater amount is entitled to a credit toward his liability in the
amount of damages owed him by the other claimant."2  In some
states, however, off-set is not allowable. The policy with reference to
off-set is not important under the Oklahoma version if only two par-
ties are involved since only one will ever be able to recover anything.
It is important in a jurisdiction that would allow recovery when each
are equally at fault. It is of considerable importance when there are
three or more parties all of whom suffered injuries. It is my position
that off-set is an objectionable feature of a comparative negligence sys-
tem because of (1) the complication resulting from it, (2) the greater
difficulty that will be encountered in evaluating claims and making
settlements and (3) the unfairness that is produced. Each claimant
should have judgment against the other for his damages diminished in
proportion to the amount of his negligence without off-set. An exam-
ple will serve to illustrate the difficulties and the consequences of a
policy permitting off-set as contrasted with that of not allowing an off-
set:
A B C
Negligence 30% 40% 30%
Damages $80,000 $100,000 $60,000
23. This is § 2(f) of the statute which is set forth in note 2 supra.
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Recovery without 56,000 60,000 42,000
Off-set
[B=32,000(C-J*)] [A=-30,000(C-J* )l A=18,000(B-J*)]
C-=24,000(B-J*)l [C=30,000(A-J*)] [B=24,000(A-J*)]
Recovery with 8,000 6,000
Off-set
[B=2,000(C-J*)] [C=6,000][C=6,000(B-J*)]
*J means joint liability.
Since much of the impetus for the passage of comparative negli-
gence statutes has been to overcome some of the arguments made
in behalf of those who have proposed no-fault schemes as a means for
compensating victims who have heretofore received no compensation
at all, the off-set provision tends to defeat the objective.
Settlements. The effect of settlements varies from state to state.24
It appears that in Oklahoma, there being no contribution statute and
therefore no problem about protecting the settling tort-feasor from
contribution, the plaintiff is only required to account for the amount
paid for the settlement.2 5 If, therefore, Oklahoma retains both the
non-contribution rule and the rule of entire liability of joint tortfeasors,
one solution would be to disregard altogether any liability that might
have existed on the part of the settling tortfeasor and compute as the
total negligence only the negligence of the claimant and the defendant
or defendants against whom recovery is sought. There would then
simply be a deduction from the liability of the defendant or defendants
in the amount of the settlement.
If, on the other hand, provision is made for contribution between
tortfeasors, then a different result would seem to be dictated. The
Texas statute provides for a distinction between two situations: When
the alleged settling tortfeasor is not made a party to the suit and when
24. See UNrFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRT-FPAsoRs AcT § 4. As adopted in
1955, this section provides as follows:
[Release or covenant not to sue] When a release or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more per-
sons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability
for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces
the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the re-
lease or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is the greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tort-feasor.
25. National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 434 P.2d 238
(Okla. 1967).
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he is.26 This distinction was based on the notion that if a settlement
was made with a person who was not a party to the suit, that settle-
ment would preclude, or should preclude, submitting to the jury the
existence and the amount of his negligence. Failure to join an alleged
settling tortfeasor neither precludes nor, arguably, should it preclude
the submission of the existence or amount of his negligence. The de-
termination of the existence or amount of his negligence is in no way
dependent on his being a party, and I see no value in making him
a formal party to the litigation except for procedural and tactical rea-
sons on the part of claimant or defendants. These reasons do not
justify making this distinction. The method provided for apportioning
the damages when the person settled with is made a party seems the
appropriate one for both situations, i.e., the settlement is a complete
release of the portion of the judgment attributable to the percentage
of negligence found on the part of that joint tortfeasor. Under the
statute, when the settling tortfeasor is not made a party, each defend-
ant deducts from the amount for which he would otherwise be held
liable a percentage of the settlement based on the relationship the de-
fendant's negligence bears to the total negligence of all defendants;
when the settling tortfeasor is made a party, the settlement is a com-
plete release of the portion of the judgment attributable to his negli-
gence. The determination of these matters for making a decision about
the rights of the parties to the suit is in no way dependent on the
presence of the settler, and the distinction should be between a set-
tlement made with one who was not legally liable and one who was.
Unresolved Issues. The adoption of comparative negligence
should and will inevitably bring about a reexamination and no doubt
alteration of several other doctrines that have developed in the context
of a compensation system in which contributory negligence was either
an absolute bar to recovery or no bar at all because of some exception
to the rule. This is not intended as a complete list but is simply meant
to identify some of the more important and obvious ones.
Last Clear Chance or Discovered Peril. The Restatement of Torts
recognizes two exceptions to the rule that contributory negligence is a
bar to recovery. These are commonly called "Last Clear Chance"
and "Discovered Peril." The first applies under the Restatement when
the defendant is found to have been negligent after he saw or should
26. §§ 2(d) and (e) of the statute which is set forth in note 2 supra contain the
provisions on this subject.
13
Keeton: Comparative Negligence--The Oklahoma Version
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
have seen the plaintiff in a helpless condition.27  The second applies
under the Restatement when the defendant is found to have been neg-
ligent after actual discovery of the plaintiff in peril who was either
helpless or inattentive. 2s Both are recognized in one form or another
in many states and one or the other in some fashion in nearly all
states.29 Without trying to describe precisely the Oklahoma position,
it appears that last clear chance is recognized when defendant is neg-
ligent after actual discovery of plaintiff in a helpless condition, or per-
haps inattentive position. 30 Both are based on the premise that the
defendant is, under the circumstances, guilty of the greater fault or is
more to blame for the damaging event out of which plaintiff's injury
arises than the plaintiff. These doctrines would never have been cre-
ated under a system that would have allowed plaintiff recovery if not
guilty of as much or less fault than the defendant. They were judge-
made comparative negligence rules. These doctrines place the entire
loss due to the fault of both parties on the defendant and inflict obvi-
ous injustice on the defendant just as when obvious injustice is in-
flicted on plaintiff when they are not applicable. They constituted
a rough way to compare fault pursuant to a judicial process that was
incapable of working out a more rational plan. They have no place
under a comparative negligence system. The Florida Supreme Court
last year, rejecting the position that the court was powerless to change
a rule that was court-made in the first place, provided for "pure" com-
parative negligence and quite correctly also held that under such a
system last clear chance has no applicability. 1 Conceivably a dis-
tinction could be drawn between a "pure" and a "modified" system from
the standpoint of the applicability of last clear chance. It could have
the effect of granting a complete recovery when otherwise only partial
or no recovery at all would be available but this would be to contra-
dict in effect the jury findings that part of the damages should be ap-
portioned to the plaintiff.
27. RESTATE3mNT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 479 (1965).
28. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTS § 480 (1965).
29. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1971); F. HAPiER & F. JmEs,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.12 (1956).
30. Jester v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 413 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1965); Kurn v. Casey,
193 Okla. 192, 141 P.2d 1001 (1943). In the last case, the court said that in order
for plaintiff to recover under the Last Clear Chance Doctrine he must show that he
was in a place of danger, that he was seen by the defendant and that there was a
failure thereafter to use ordinary care to avoid the injury. The court said that the
doctrine does not apply where the defendant did not discover the injured person's ex-
posure to danger in time to prevent the injury.
31. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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Voluntary Assumption of the Risk. It has been the rule gener-
ally that a claimant who fully understands a risk of harm to himself
or his things caused by defendant's conduct or by the condition of the
defendant's land or chattels and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses
to encounter it manifests his willingness to accept it and cannot re-
cover.82  I have vigorously criticized this doctrine, 33 and there is a
growing dissatisfaction with it.84 Many courts have confused this sub-
ject by treating assumption of the risk as a kind of contributory neg-
ligence. The doctrine when applied as stated above means that a
claimant is barred of recovery even when he was reasonable in en-
countering the danger since the bar to recovery is based not on fault
of the plaintiff but on a kind of manifestation of consent to accept the
risk. As a doctrine separate from contributory negligence, it has clearly
been recognized in Oklahoma when invitees encounter known danger-
ous conditions on land. 35 It has been recognized in many states as
applicable when a passenger sues his own driver and appreciated that
the driver was temporarily incapacitated such as drunk or sleepy and
voluntarily chose to ride with him."s Normally, contributory negli-
gence can be found but there are circumstances where a passenger
could be reasonable in remaining in the car with knowledge and ap-
preciation of the risk. Since the basis for the assumed risk defense is
the willingness of the plaintiff to take a chance under circumstances
where he was fully informed and free not to do so, this defense is not
necessarily abolished by the adoption of comparative negligence. A
plaintiff should never be denied recovery when the defendant's negli-
gent conduct forced the plaintiff into the dilemma of having to forego
a legitimate purpose or to face the negligently created hazard without
recourse. This being the case, the adoption of comparative negligence
affords the courts an opportunity to abolish the defense.
32. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 4960 (1965); Keeton, Personal Injuries
Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 PA. L. Ruv. 629 (1952).
33. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REv. 108 (1961).
34. McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d
14 (1962) (a comparative negligence jurisdiction). This case involved a passenger su-
ing his driver and the court said there may be circumstances where a guest's willingness
to proceed in the face of a known hazard for which the host is responsible is not
unreasonable and his willingness to ride in the face of a known hazard is no longer
a defense. See also Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962), where
the court said that to bar recovery when the employee is acting reasonably in exposing
himself is to indulge in the unrealistic and rigid presumption that in so exposing him-
self, the employee "assents" to relieve his employer from responsibility.
35. The defense is discussed in Davis v. Whitsett, 435 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1967) and
in S.H. Kress & Co. v. Maddox, 201 Okla. 190, 203 P.2d 706 (1949).
36. W. Pnossnn, LAw oF ToRTs § 68 at 446 (4th ed. 1971).
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Imputed Contributory Negligence. Imputed contributory negli-
gence is a doctrine that is based on the theory that a relationship
sometimes exists between an injured person and another which renders
it inequitable or unfair to permit the injured person to recover from
a negligent third person, if the injury results in part from the negli-
gence of the other party to the relationship.a7  The negligence of a
servant has been imputed to the master to bar the master's recovery
and the negligence of a driver has often been imputed to a passenger
to bar the passenger's recovery against another driver when the pas-
senger and his driver were on a joint enterprise. These rules have been
adopted in Oklahoma.38 The thought has been that in those situations
where a person is vicariously liable for the negligence of another he
should in like manner be charged with his negligence if an attempt is
made to recover against another. There is a fallacy here. When a
passenger-joint enterpriser is held vicariously liable to a non-negligent
person in another car, the litigation is between two persons who are
blameless, and it is thought to be better social policy to shift the loss
to the innocent enterpriser, leaving him with the risk of insolvency of
the negligent actor, rather than place this risk on the victim. But
when a blameless enterpriser is suing a wrongdoer, the choice is not
between two innocent persons. In a comparative negligence system
it would seem obvious that the existence or not of a joint enterprise
between a passenger and a driver should not affect the apportionment
of damages between those who are wrongdoers. Let us assume the fol-
lowing: passenger-enterpriser-20% negligent; driver-enterpriser-
40% negligent; driver A-40% negligent. Arguably, if imputed con-
tributory negligence is retained as a doctrine, then a passenger could
not recover against Driver A in this illustration because his negligence
would be combined with that of his driver to make him guilty of the
greater negligence. But this is not what the statute says shall be done
and arguably a proper construction of the statute would be that the
doctrine has been legislatively abolished. Even if the negligence of the
driver is imputable to the passenger, the maximum quantum of negli-
gence should be that of the driver if the passenger's negligence is
simply that of failing to control the conduct of the driver. In other
37. Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEx. L. REv. 161 (1935).
38. Wagner v. McKernan, 198 Okla. 425, 177 P.2d 511 (1947). (The owner of
the car was riding as passenger). Imputed contributory negligence has not, however,
been favored by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Danner v. Chandler, 204 Okla. 693,
233 P.2d 953 (1951); St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Bell, 58 Okla. 84, 159 P. 336 (1916).
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words, the most their combined negligence could be is the amount of
the primary negligence-the conduct of the driver.
Conclusion
As stated heretofore, no effort has been made to identify all of
the issues that comparative negligence raises or to answer in any defini-
tive way those that have been discussed. While the Oklahoma statute
is a step in the right direction toward providing a more just compen-
sation system for victims of all kinds of damaging events unintention-
ally produced, there are many unresolved issues that will require legis-
lative or judicial action to resolve.
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